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Abstract
A rational and selﬁsh environment may have an incentive to cheat the system it interacts with.
Cheating the system amounts to reporting a stream of inputs that is different from the one corre-
sponding to the real behavior of the environment. The system may cope with cheating by charging
penalties to cheats it detects. In this paper, we formalize this setting by means of weighted automata
and their resilience to selﬁsh environments. Automata have proven to be a successful formalism for
modeling the on-going interaction between a system and its environment. In particular, weighted ﬁ-
nite automata (WFAs), which assign a cost to each input word, are useful in modeling an interaction
that has a quantitative outcome. Consider a WFA A over the alphabet S. At each moment in time,
the environment may cheat A by reporting a letter different from the one it actually generates. A
penalty function h : S×S → IR≥0 maps each possible false-report to a penalty, charged whenever
the false-report is detected. A detection-probability function p : S×S → [0,1] gives the probability
of detecting each false-report. We say that A is (h,p)-resilient to cheating if  h,p  ensures that the
minimal expected cost of an input word is achieved with no cheating. Thus, a rational environment
has no incentive to cheat A .
We study the basic problems arising in the analysis of this setting. In particular, we consider the
problem of deciding whether a given WFA A is (h,p)-resilient with respect to a given penalty func-
tion h and a detection-probability function p; and the problem of achieving resilience with minimum
resources, namely, given A and h, ﬁnding the minimal (with respect to ås,s′ h(s,s′)  p(s,s′))
detection-probability function p, such that A is (h,p)-resilient. While for general WFAs both prob-
lems are shown to be PSPACE-hard, we present polynomial-time algorithms for deterministic WFAs.
1 Introduction
The environment of modern systems often consists of other systems, having objectives of their own.
For example, an e-commerce applications interacts with sellers and buyers. A seller may provide a
non-reliable description of the goods he is selling. Furthermore, sellers may provide false feedback and
twisted rating of their competitors. Buyers may commit to some transaction but not accomplish it, or
may provide a bid that is lower than the real value they are willing to pay, hoping to win even with it. As
another example, the environment of various service-providing systems are clients that wish to minimize
their payment. Clients’ payments may be based on their self-reports, which are usually screened but may
be false. In the same way, biased users may affect the quality of recommendation systems for various
products or services.
The above examples demonstrate the fact that environments have two types of behaviors: the truthful
behavior – the one they would produce if they follow their protocol, and the reported behavior – the one
they actually output, hoping it would lead to a better outcome for them. While the design of systems
cannot assume that the environment would take its truthful behavior, we can assume that environments
are rational, in the sense they always take a behavior that maximizes their outcome.
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Mechanism design is a ﬁeld in game theory and economics studying the design of games for rational
players. A game is incentive compatible if no player has an incentive to deviate from his truthful behavior
[NR99, NRTV07]. The outcome of traditional games depend on the ﬁnal position of the game. In
contrast, the systems we want to reason about maintain an on-going interaction with their environment
[HP85], andreasoningabouttheirbehaviorrefernottotheirﬁnalstate(infact, muchoftheresearchinthe
area considers non-terminating systems, with no ﬁnal state) but rather to the language of computations
that they generate. In [FKL10], the authors study rational synthesis, where the synthesized systems are
guaranteed to satisfy their speciﬁcations when they interact with rational environments (rather than with
hostile environments that do not have objectives other than to fail the system [PR89]). In this paper, we
suggest and study a possible model for reasoning about incentive capacity in the context of on-going
behaviors and quantitative properties, or formal power series. Reporting of trustworthy information is an
essential component also in service-providing systems.
Automata have proven to be a successful formalism for modeling on-going behaviors. Consider a
system with a set P of atomic propositions. Each assignment to the atomic propositions corresponds
to a letter s in the alphabet 2P. Accordingly, a computation of the system, which is a sequence of
such assignments, is a word over the alphabet 2P, and a speciﬁcation for the system is a language over
this alphabet, describing the desired properties of the system. By translating speciﬁcations to automata,
it is possible to reduce questions about systems and their speciﬁcations to questions about automata
[VW94]. For example, a system S satisﬁes a speciﬁcation y if the language that contains exactly all the
computations generated by S is contained in the language of an automaton that accepts exactly all words
satisfying y.
A boolean language maps words to true or false. A qualitative language maps words to values
from a richer domain [CCH+05, Hen07]. A Weighted automaton A on ﬁnite words (WFAs, for short)
[Eil74, SS78, Moh97, DKe09] deﬁnes a quantitative language L : S∗ → IR≥0 ∪{¥}. Technically, each
transition of A has a traversal cost, each state has an acceptance cost, and the cost of a run is the sum
of the costs of the transitions taken along the run plus the acceptance cost of its last state. The cost of a
word is then the minimum cost over all runs on it (note that the cost may be inﬁnite).
A rational and selﬁsh environment may have an incentive to cheat the WFA and report a word dif-
ferent from the one generated by its truthful behavior. The WFA may cope with cheating by charging
penalties to cheats it detects. Formally, at each moment in time, the environment may cheat the WFA by
reporting a letter different from the one its truthful behavior generates. A detection-probability function
p:S×S→[0,1] gives the probability of detecting each false-report. A penalty function h :S×S→IR≥0
gives the penalty charged whenever a particular false-report is detected. Thus, when the environment re-
ports that a letter s is s′, then the WFA detects the cheating with probability p(s,s′), in which case the
environment is charged h(s,s′). The expected cost of a word w is then the minimum (over all words w′
of the same length as w) cost of w′ plus the expected cost of reporting w to be w′. We say that a WFA
A is (h,p)-resilient to cheating if  h,p  ensures that, for all words, the above minimal expected cost is
achieved in a cheat-free run. Thus, a dominant strategy for the environment is one that does not cheat.
We study the basic problems arising in the analysis of this setting. First, we observe that, by linearity
of expectation, a detection probability function p and a penalty function h can be combined to a single
expected-feefunctionq =h◦p; thatis, foralls,s′ ∈S, wehaveq(s,s′)=h(s,s′) p(s,s′). Accord-
ingly, we can study q-resilience, which simpliﬁes the probabilistic reasoning. Second, we make use of
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the fact it is possible to construct, given a WFA A and an expected-fee function q, a WFA Cheat(A ,q)
that takes cheating into account and in which the cost of a word is its minimal possible cost (achieved
by a best cheating strategy). We show that q-resilience to cheating is a semantic property. Thus, given
a weighted language L : S∗ → IR≥0 ∪{¥}, and a penalty function q, then either all WFAs for A are
q-resilient to cheating, or none of them is. It follows that the natural problem of translating a given WFA
A that need not be q-resilient to cheating to an equivalent WFA that is q-resilient to cheating is not
interesting, as equivalent WFAs have the same resilience.
With these observations and constructions, we turn to study the practical problems of the setting.
From the environment’s point of view, we consider the problem of ﬁnding, given A , q, and a word
w ∈ S∗, a word w′ such that the environment can minimize the cost of w in A by reporting it to be w′.
We show that the problem can be reduced to the problem of ﬁnding a shortest path in a graph, which can
be solved in polynomial time [Dij59].
We then turn to study problems from the designer’s point of view. We start with the problem of
deciding whether a given WFA A is q-resilient to cheating with respect to a given expected fee function
q. We show that the problem is PSPACE-hard, but present a polynomial-time solution for the case A is
deterministic. Our solution is based on dynamic programming, taking into account words of increasing
lengths. In particular, we show that cycles along which cheating is beneﬁcial (and can therefore lead to
an unbounded incentive to cheat) can be detected after quadratically many iterations.
A system with no limits on penalties and with unbounded resources can prevent cheating by ﬁxing a
high expected-fee function. In practice, penalties may be limited by an external authority, and increasing
the probability of detecting cheats requires resources. Consider a WFA A and two expected-fee func-
tions q1 and q2 such that q1 ≤ q2 (that is q1(s,s′) ≤ q2(s,s′) for all s,s′ ∈ S). If A is q1-resilient to
cheating, then A is clearly also q2-resilient to cheating, yet q1 achieves resilience more efﬁciently. In
particular, q1 can be obtained from q2 by reducing the probability of cheat detection, hence saving on re-
sources required for cheat detection. Recall that q =h◦p, for a penalty function h and a detection prob-
ability function p. Assuming that the penalty function h is determined by an external authority, and that
system’s resources are allocated to increase the detection probability, we consider the following problem
of minimal resources resilience: Given a WFA A and a penalty function h, ﬁnd a probability detection
function p such that A is (h ◦ p)-resilient, and the detection budget, given by ås,s′ h(s,s′)p(s,s′),
is minimal. Note that the probabilities in our objective function are weighted by h. This reﬂects the
fact that detecting a cheat with a high penalty tends to require high resources. Indeed, in practice, the
higher is the responsibility of a guard, the higher is his salary. We study the minimal resources resilience
problem and show that it is PSPACE-hard. As in resilience testing, the problem is easier in the deter-
ministic case, for which we present a polynomial-time solution, based on describing the problem as a
linear program. Essentially, the constraints of the linear program are induced by the restrictions used
in the testing algorithm, with the expected-fee values being variables. The same method can be used in
order to solve additional minimal-budget problems, with any desired linear objective function over the
detection-probability function or the penalty function.
We also consider two variants of the setting. In the rising-penalty variant, the expected penalty for
cheating increases with the number of cheats. This variant reﬂects the realistic response of systems to
user’s false report: allocating more resources to cheat detection, or formally, increasing the detection
probability with each detected cheat. In the bounded cheating variant the number of times the environ-
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ment can cheat or the total budget it can invest in penalties is bounded.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we give a formal description of the model we consider, and present several observations
and constructions that will be used throughout the paper.
2.1 Weighted Finite Automaton
Given an alphabet S, a weighted language is a function L : S∗ → IR≥0∪{¥} mapping each word in S∗
to a positive (possibly ¥) cost. A weighted ﬁnite automaton (WFA, for short) is A =  S,Q,D,c,Q0,t ,
where S is a ﬁnite input alphabet, Q is a ﬁnite set of states, D ⊆ Q×S×Q is a transition relation,
c : D → IR≥0 is a cost function, Q0 ⊆ Q is a set of initial states, and t : Q → IR≥0 ∪{¥} is a ﬁnal
cost function. A transition d =  q,s,p  ∈ D (also written D(q,s,p)) can be taken when reading the
input letter s ∈ S, and it causes A to move from state q to state p with cost c(d). The transition
relation D induces a transition function d : Q×S → 2Q, where for a state q ∈ Q and a letter s ∈ S, we
have d(q,s) := {p : D(q,s,p)}. We extend d to sets of states, by letting d(S,a) :=
S
q∈Sd(q,a), and
recursively to words in S∗, by letting d(q,e) = q, and d(q,u s) := d(d(q,u),s), for every u ∈ S∗ and
s ∈ S.
Note that a WFA A may be nondeterministic in the sense that it may have many initial states, and
the transition function may lead to several successor states. If |Q0| = 1 and for every state q ∈ Q and
letter s ∈ S we have |d(q,s)| ≤ 1, then A is a deterministic WFA (for short, DWFA).
For a word w = w1...wn ∈ S∗, a run of A on w is a sequence r = r0,r1,...,rn ∈ Qn+1, where
r0 ∈ Q0 and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have D(ri−1,wi,ri). The cost of a run is the sum of the costs of
the transitions that constitute the run, along with the ﬁnal cost. 1 Formally, let r = r0,r1,...,rn be a
run of A on w, and let d = d1...dn ∈ D∗ be the corresponding sequence of transitions. The cost of r is
cost(A ,r) = å
n
i=1c(di)+t(rn). For two indices 1 ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ n, we use cost(A ,r, j1, j2) to denote the
cost of the sub-run leading from qj1−1 to qj2. Thus, cost(A ,r, j1, j2) = å
j2
i=j1 c(di) The cost of w in A ,
denoted cost(A ,w), is the minimal cost over all runs of A on w. Thus, cost(A ,w) = min{cost(A ,r) :
r is an accepting run of A on w}. Note that while WFAs do not have a set of acceptance states, runs that
reach states q for which t(q) = ¥ have cost ¥, thus the function t can be viewed as a reﬁnement of
the partition of the state space to accepting and rejecting states. The weighted language of A , denoted
L(A ), maps each word w ∈ S∗ to cost(A ,w).
We assume that all states q ∈ Q are reachable in A . We assume that all states, except maybe the
initial states are not empty, in the sense they map at least one word to a ﬁnite cost. Thus, for all q ∈ Q
there is w ∈ S∗ such that the cost of w in A with initial state q is in IR. Finally, given two WFAs A
and A ′, we say that A is cheaper than A ′, denoted A   A ′, if for every word w ∈ S∗, we have that
cost(A ,w) ≤ cost(A ′,w).
1In general, a WFA may be deﬁned with respect to any semiring  IK,⊕,⊗,0,1 . The cost of a run is then the semiring
product of the weights along it, and the cost of a word is the semiring sum over all runs on it. For our purposes, we focus
on weighted automata deﬁned with respect to the min-sum semiring,  IR≥0∪{¥},min,+,¥,0  (sometimes called the tropical
semiring), as deﬁned above.
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2.2 Input Cheating and Resilience of Automata
Recall that a WFA induces a weighted language that maps each word to a cost in IR≥0 ∪{¥}. Words
may cheat the automaton hoping to be mapped to a lower cost: When the automaton runs on a word
w = w1...wn ∈ S∗, then in each position 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the word can cheat the automaton and report that the
letter wi is a different letter w′
i ∈ S. Cheating has a price, and the setting includes a penalty function h :
S×S → IR≥0, satisfying h(s,s) = 0, and a detection-probability function p : S×S → [0,1] indicating
the probability of catching each speciﬁc cheat. Formally, whenever s is reported to be s′, the automaton
detects the cheating with probability p(s,s′), in which case it charges h(s,s′). The expected penalty
for reporting s to be s′ is therefore h(s,s′)  p(s,s′).
For two words w = w1,w2,...,wn and w′ = w′
1,w′
2,...,w′
n, the expected cost of reporting w to be
w′ is å
n
i=1h(wi,w′
i)  p(wi,w′
i). Given a WFA A , a penalty function h, a detection-probability func-
tion p, and two words w,w′ such that |w| = |w′|, the expected cost of w in A when w is reported to
be w′, denoted expected faked cost(A ,h,p,w,w′), is cost(A ,w′)+å
n
i=1h(wi,w′
i)  p(wi,w′
i). Finally,
expected best cost(A ,h,p,w) is the lowest expected cost with which w can be read by A (with or with-
out cheating). Thus, expected best cost(A ,h,p,w) = minw′:|w′|=|w|expected faked cost(A ,h,p,w,w′).
We refer to the word w′ with which the minimum is achieved as the cheating pattern for w.
We say that A is (h,p)-resilient to cheating if it is not worthwhile to cheat A given the penalty
function h and the detection-probability function p. Formally, A is (h,p)-resilient to cheating if for
every input word w, it holds that cost(A ,w) = expected best cost(A ,h,p,w).
Studying resilience of automata, it is convenient to consider a non-probabilistic setting in which
cheats are always detected. We use ˆ 1 denote the detection-probability function satisfying ˆ 1(s,s′) = 1
for all s,s′ ∈ S. As argued in Theorem 2.1 below, the probabilistic setting can be easily reduced to the
non-probabilistic one. The theorem follows easily from the linearity of expectation.
Theorem 2.1. Consider a WFA A , penalty function h, and detection-probability function p. Let q =
h ◦ p. Thus, q : S×S → IR≥0 is such that for all s,s′ ∈ S, we have that q(s,s′) = h(s,s′)  p(s,s′).
Then, for every w ∈ S∗, we have expected best cost(A ,h,p,w) = expected best cost(A ,q,ˆ 1,w)
Thus, by considering the penalty function q = h ◦ p, we can reduce a probabilistic setting with h
and p to a non-probabilistic one. The cost of a word in A is still an expected one, but for simplic-
ity of notations, we use the terms faked cost(A ,q,w,w′) and best cost(A ,q,w), which are analogue
to expected faked cost(A ,h,p,w,w′) and expected best cost(A ,h,p,w), and refer to q-resilience to
cheating, rather than (h,p)-resilience.
Example 2.2. Consider the DWFA A in Figure 1. Every state qi in the ﬁgure is labeled by its ﬁnal cost.
For example, t(q4) = 4, and t(q3) = x, for some x ∈ IR. Every transition is labeled by the letter and
cost associated with it. For example, D(q2,b,q5) and c(q2,b,q5) = 1. Assume that the penalty function
is uniform and for all s,s′ ∈ {a,b,c} with s  = s′, we have q(s,s′) = 2.
The DWFA A demonstrates two of the phenomenon that makes the analysis of cheating challenging.
First, testing an WFA for q-resilience (even a DWFA, and even with a uniform q) may not be local. In
our example, if we take x = 0, then it is easy to see that for every three states q,q′, and q′′, and two letters
s and s′, it holds that c(q,s,q′)+t(q′) ≤ c(q,s′,q′′)+t(q′′)+q(s,s′); that is, for all words of length
1 it is not beneﬁcial to cheat, independent of the initial state. Clearly, this is a necessary condition for
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A to be q-resilient: if there are q,q′,q′′,s, and s′ that violate the condition, then the word w s for
which d(q0,w) = q, has faked cost(A ,q,w s,w s′) < cost(A ,w s), thus best cost(A ,q,w s) <
cost(A ,w s) and w s has an incentive to cheat and pretend to be w s′. This condition, however, is
not sufﬁcient. For example, cost(A ′,aa) = 8 while faked cost(A ,q,aa,bb) = 2+2q(a,b) = 6. That
is, aa has an incentive to cheat and pretend to be bb.
Second, A demonstrates that cheating may be beneﬁcial only for words that are unboundedly long.
To see this, note that cost(A ,bck) = k+1 and cost(A ,ck+1) = x+1. Since cheating in the ﬁrst letter
costs 2, we have that best cost(A ,q,bck)=min(k+1,x+3) and best cost(A ,q,ck+1)=min(k+3,x+
1). Thus, the larger x is, the longer are the shortest input words that have an incentive to cheat.
q0,0
q1,0
q2,0
q3,x
q4,4
q5,0
a,2
b,1
c,1
a,3     c,1
a,0 
b,0 
c,0
a,2
b,1
a,4 
b,4 
c,4
a,4 
b,4 
c,4
b,4     c,4
q0,0
q1,0
q2,0
q3,x
q4,4
q5,0
a,2
b,1
c,1
a,3     c,1
a,0 
b,0 
c,0
a,2
b,1
a,4 
b,4 
c,4
a,4 
b,4 
c,4
b,4     c,4
Figure 1: The DWFA A .
A basic challenge in the setting of rational environments is to design systems in which the envi-
ronment has no incentive to cheat. In our setting, one could ask whether a given WFA A that is not
q-resilient to cheating can be modiﬁed to an equivalent WFA A ′ that is q-resilient to cheating. Theo-
rem 2.3 below states that this is impossible.
Theorem 2.3. Resilience to cheating is a semantic property. That is, given a weighted language L:S∗ →
IR≥0∪{¥} and a penalty function q, either all WFAs for L are q-resilient to cheating, or none of them
is q-resilient to cheating.
Proof: Let A1 and A2 be two WFAs for L. Thus, for every w ∈ S∗, we have that cost(A1,w) =
cost(A2,w) = L(w). We show that if A1 is not q-resilient to cheating, then so is A2. Assume that
A1 is not q-resilient to cheating, and let w and w′ be such that |w′| = |w| and faked cost(A1,q,w,w′) <
cost(A1,w). Recall that faked cost(A1,q,w,w′) = cost(A1,w′)+q(w,w′). By the equivalence of A1
and A2, we have that cost(A1,w) = cost(A2,w) and cost(A1,w′) = cost(A2,w′). Hence, since q(w,w′)
is independent of the WFA, we also have faked cost(A2,q,w,w′) < cost(A2,w), and we are done.
Note that Theorem 2.3 applies for both nondeterministic and deterministic WFAs. Thus, nondeter-
minism cannot help a WFA to cope with cheats. Note also that Theorem 2.3 considers a given penalty
function q and does not include the possibility of achieving resilience by modifying the penalty function,
possibly using the same budget. We will get back to this problem in Section 4.
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2.3 The Cheating-Allowed Automaton
Reasoning about a WFA A and its resilience to cheating, one has to take into account the inﬁnitely many
possible cheating patterns that A should be resilient too. In this section we show that these patterns can
be modeled by a single WFA obtained from A by adding transitions that mimics cheating.
Theorem 2.4. Consider a WFA A and a penalty function q : S×S → IR≥0. There is a WFA A ′, with
the same state space as A , such that cost(A ′,w) = best cost(A ,q,w).
Proof: Let A =  S,Q,D,c,q0,t . We deﬁne A ′ =  S,Q,D′,c′,q0,t , where the transition relation D′
and the cost function c′ are deﬁned as follows. For every two states q,q′ ∈ Q, if there is s′ ∈ S such that
D(q,s′,q′), then D′(q,s,q′) for every s ∈ S, and c′(q,s,q′) = mins′:D(q,s′,q′){c(q,s′,q′)+q(s,s′)}.
That is, if the set S′ of letters with which A can move from q to q′ is not empty, then A ′ can move from
q to q′ with all letters – by reporting them to be some letter in S′. The cost of this transition for a letter
s is calculated by taking the most beneﬁcial replacement from S′: the one that minimizes the sum of the
cost of the transition and the cost of cheating.
It is not hard to see the correspondence between the nondeterminism of A ′ and the choices of cheat-
ing patterns. Formally, for every word w, a cheating pattern w′ for w induces a run of A ′ on w whose
cost is faked cost(A ,q,w,w′). Likewise, every run of A ′ on w induces a word w′ that can serve as a
cheating pattern for w. Hence, since the cost of w in A ′ is the minimal cost of some run of A ′ on w, we
have that best cost(A ,q,w) = cost(A ′,w), and we are done.
Given a WFA A and a penalty function q, we refer to the WFA A ′ constructed in Theorem 2.4 as
Cheat(A ,q). For example, the WFA in Figure 2 is Cheat(A ,q), for the WFA A described in Figure 1
and q(s,s′) = 2 for all s,s′ ∈ S with s  = s′.
q0,0
q1,0
q2,0
q3,x
q4,4
q5,0
a,2; b,4; c,4
a,3; b,1; c,3
a,3; b,3; c,1
a,3; b,3; c,1
a,0 
b,0 
c,0
a,4 
b,4 
c,4
a,4 
b,4 
c,4
a,6; b,4; c,4
a,2 
b,4 
c,4
a,3 
b,1 
c,3 q0,0
q1,0
q2,0
q3,x
q4,4
q5,0
a,2; b,4; c,4
a,3; b,1; c,3
a,3; b,3; c,1
a,3; b,3; c,1
a,0 
b,0 
c,0
a,4 
b,4 
c,4
a,4 
b,4 
c,4
a,6; b,4; c,4
a,2 
b,4 
c,4
a,3 
b,1 
c,3
Figure 2: The WFA A ′ =Cheat(A ,q), with uniform q = 2.
Corollary 2.5. For every WFA A and penalty function q, we have that A is q-resilient to cheating iff
A   Cheat(A ,q), that is, for every word w ∈ S∗, we have that cost(A ,w) ≤ cost(Cheat(A ,q),w).
Theorem 2.6. Given a WFA A , a penalty function q, and a word w ∈ S∗, the problem of ﬁnding
best cost(A ,q,w) and a cheating pattern for it, can be solved in polynomial time.
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Proof: Given a WFA A and a word w ∈ S∗, it is possible to ﬁnd cost(A ,w) as follows (note that we
refer here to cost without cheating). If A is deterministic, we traverse the single run of A on w and
ﬁnd its cost. If A is nondeterministic, we ﬁrst restrict A to runs along which w is read, and then ﬁnd
the cheapest such run. Formally, we deﬁne the product Aw of A with an un-weighted automaton with
|w|+1 states whose language is {w}. The WFA Aw describes exactly all the run of A on w and it has no
cycles. We apply to Aw a shortest-path algorithm [Dij59] and ﬁnd the shortest path from an initial state
to a ﬁnal state.
Now, givenA andq, letA ′ beCheat(A ,q). Then, foreverywordw, wehavethatbest cost(A ,q,w)=
cost(A ′,w), which can be calculated as described above. Also, the run r′ of A ′ on w for which
cost(A ′,w) = cost(r′,w) reveals the cheating pattern.
Limited Cheating and Rising Penalty Variants: In the above described setting, an input word can
cheat as many times as it wants. Also, the penalties are ﬁxed throughout the interaction. It is easy
to modify the construction of Cheat(A ,q) and, consequently, our results below, to account for variant
models. For example, by taking several copies of Cheat(A ,q), it is possible to give a constant bound
on the number of allowed cheats (the states maintain the number of cheats detected so far) or constant
bound on the budget a word can use for cheating (the states maintain the total cheating costs detected
so far). By taking several copies of Cheat(A ,q) and modifying the costs in the different copies, it is
possible to let A increase the penalties when cheats are detected (this corresponds to increasing either
the detection-probability function or the penalties themselves; as indeed happens in practice when cheats
are detected).
3 Resilience Testing
In this section we study the problem of deciding, given a WFA A and a penalty function q, whether A
is q-resilient to cheating. Recall that A is q-resilient to cheating if cost(A ,w) = best cost(A ,q,w).
We show that the problem is PSPACE-hard for WFA but can be solved in polynomial time for DWFA.
3.1 Hardness Proof for WFA
Theorem 3.1. Consider a WFA A and a penalty function q. The problem of deciding whether A is
q-resilient is PSPACE-hard.
Proof: We do a reduction from the universality problem for NFAs, proven to be PSPACE-hard in
[RS59]. Given an NFA U , we construct a WFA AU such that AU is 0-resilient (that is, q(s,s′)=0 for
all s,s′ ∈ S) iff U is universal. Note that an automaton is 0-resilient iff no input word has an incentive
to cheat even if cheating is free. The idea behind the construction is that words not in L(U ) would
induce words that have an incentive to cheat AU . Thus, U is universal iff no word has an incentive to
cheat AU , so even the 0 penalties sufﬁce to ensure resilience. Formally, let U =  S,Q,D,Q0,F , where
F ⊆ Q is a set of ﬁnal states, and let a be some letter in S. We assume that |S| > 1. We deﬁne AU to
go with the letter a to a copy of U and to go with all letters S\{a} to an accepting sink (see Figure 3).
Thus, AU =  S,Q∪{q0,qqcc},D′,{q0},c,t , where D′ = D∪({q0}×{a}×Q0)∪({q0}×(S\{a})×
{qacc})∪({qacc}×S×{qacc}).
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q0,0
  U              
a,0
qacc,0
Σ-{a},0
Σ,0
q0,0
  U              
a,0
qacc,0
Σ-{a},0
Σ,0
Figure 3: The WFA AU .
Also, for all  q,s,q′  ∈ D′, we have c( q,s,q′ ) = 0 and for all q ∈ Q∪{q0,qqcc} we have t(q) = 0.
It is easy to see that AU accepts (with cost 0) all words of the form a w, for w ∈ L(U ), or of the
form s  w, for s  = a and w ∈ S∗. Accordingly, if U is universal, then AU accepts all words in S∗
with cost 0, and is therefore 0-resilient. Also, if U is not universal, then there is w  ∈ L(U ) such that
cost(AU ,a w) = ¥, while faked cost(AU ,a w,b w) = q(a,b), for any b ∈ S\{a}. Hence, AU is not
0-resilient, and we are done.
Many fundamental problems about WFAs are still open. Unlike standard (non-weighted) automata,
not all weighted automata can be determinized [Moh97]. In fact, even the problem of deciding whether
a given WFA has an equivalent DWFA is open, and so are problems that use determinization in their
solution, like deciding whether A   A ′ for two WFAs A and A ′ [Kro94, CDH08]. We note that the
problem of deciding whether A  A ′ is open even when A is a DWFA – it is the nondeterminism in A ′
that makes the problem challenging. Thus, even for the case A is deterministic, we cannot reduce the
problem of deciding whether A   Cheat(A ,q) to a problem whose solution is known. As we describe
below, we are still able to present a polynomial solution to the problem.
3.2 A Polynomial Algorithm for DWFA
We turn to consider the case where A is deterministic. We show that in this case, the problem of deciding
whether A is q-resilient, for a given penalty function q, can be solved in polynomial time. Let A =
 S,Q,D,c,q0,t  be a DWFA. Let n = |Q|. For a given penalty function q, let A ′ =  S,Q,D′,c′,q0,t 
be Cheat(A ,q). We describe an algorithm for deciding whether A   A ′. By Corollary 2.5, the latter
holds iff A is q-resilient to cheating.
Our algorithm is similar to the algorithm for deciding whether a given DWFA is equivalent to a WFA
in which it is embodied [AKL09]. We deﬁne a sequence of functions h0,h1,... : Q×Q → IR∪{¥,−¥},
as follows. 2 Intuitively, hi(q,q′) indicates how much a word of length at most i can gain if instead of
a run of A that leads to q it takes a run of A ′ that leads to q′. This difference does not include the
ﬁnal costs of q, and q′. Note that there may not be words of length at most i along which q and q′ are
reachable, in which case hi(q,q′) would be −¥. Also, it may be that for all words w of length at most i,
the cheapest run in A ′ that reads w and leads to q′ costs more than the run of A that reads w and leads
to q, in which case hi(q,q′) is negative.
2In the deﬁnition of hi we use addition and subtraction on the elements of IR∪{¥,−¥}. For every ﬁnite x ∈ IR, we have
¥−x = ¥, and x−¥ = −¥. Also ¥−¥ = 0.
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It is easy to see that if for some i ∈ IN and q,q′ ∈ Q, we have that hi(q,q′) > t(q′)−t(q), then there
is a word of length at most i for which cost(A ,w) > cost(A ′,w), thus A    A ′. We show that hi can
be calculated efﬁciently, and that even though the sequence of functions may not reach a ﬁxed-point, it
is possible to determine whether A   A ′ after calculating hi for i = 0,...,O(n2). Intuitively, it follows
from the fact that not reaching a ﬁxed-point after O(n2) iterations points to cycles along which the gain
of A ′ with respect to A is unbounded.
We initialize h0(q0,q0) = 0 and h0(q,q′) = −¥ for all other pairs. Indeed, (q0,q0) is the only pair of
states to which an empty word might reach on A and A ′.
The calculation of hi+1, for i ≥ 0, uses a function gi+1 : Q×Q×S → IR∪{¥,−¥}. Intuitively,
gi+1(q,q′,s) indicates how much a word of length at most i+1 that ends with the letter s can gain if
instead of a run of A that leads to q it takes a run of A ′ that leads to q′. Then,
gi+1(q,q′,s) = max
p,p′:D(p,s,q) ∧ D′(p′,s,q′)
(hi(p,p′)+c(p,s,q)−c′(p′,s,q′)). (1)
Thus, the calculation of gi+1(q,q′,s) considers all pairs  p,p′  ∈ Q from which q and q′ can be
reached, respectively, when a is read. Since gi+1(q,q′,s) is the gain obtained by running in A ′ instead
of in A , we add to hi(p,p′) the cost of the transition  p,s,q  in A and subtract the cost of the transition
 p′,s,q′  in A ′. Now, for i ≥ 0, we have
hi+1(q,q′) = max{hi(q,q′),max
s∈S
gi+1(q,q′,s)}. (2)
For i ≥ 0 and q,q′ ∈ Q, we say that a word w witnesses hi(q,q′) if |w| ≤ i and there is a run of A ′ on
w that leads to q′ and traversing its transitions costs hi(q,q′) less than traversing the transitions of the run
of A on w, which leads to q. Note that since the functions hi ignore the ﬁnal costs, the above refers to
the cost of traversing the transitions along the runs, rather than the cost of the runs. Clearly, if hi(q,q′) is
ﬁnite, then it has at least one witness.
We can now present the algorithm for deciding whether A   A′:
1. For i = 0,...,n2: Calculate hi; if for some q,q′ ∈ Q, we have hi(q,q′) > t(q′)−t(q), then return
(A    A ′).
2. For i = n2 +1,...,2n2: Calculate hi; if for some q,q′ ∈ Q, we have hi−1(q,q′) < hi(q,q′), then
return (A    A ′).
3. Return(A   A ′).
We prove the correctness of the algorithm.
Assume ﬁrst that the algorithm returns that A    A ′. We distinguish between two cases. If the
algorithm declares that A   A ′ in Step 1, then the word w that witnesses hi(q,q′) satisﬁes cost(A ′,w)<
cost(A ,w). If the algorithm declares that A    A ′ in Step 2, let n2 < i ≤ 2n2 and q,q′ ∈ Qi+1 be
such that hi(q,q′) < hi+1(q,q′), and let w be the word of length i+1 that witnesses hi+1(q,q′). Let
r = q0,...,qi+1 be the single run of A on w, and let r′ = q′
0,...,q′
i+1 be a run of A ′ on w such that
cost(A ′,w) = cost(A ′,r′). Thus, r′ is the run of A ′ along which cost(A ′,w) is obtained. Note that
q=qi+1 and q′ =q′
i+1. Since i+1>n2, there must be two indices 0≤ j1 < j2 ≤i+1 such that qj1 =qj2
and q′
j1 = q′
j2. Let g = cost(A ,r, j1+1, j2) and g′ = cost(A ′,r′, j1+1, j2).
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Consider the word w′ = w1   wj1  wj2+1   wi+1. Thus, w′ is obtained from w by removing the sub-
wordwj1+1   wj2 alongwhichA andA ′ cycle. ThesinglerunofA onw′ isv=q0,...,qj1,qj2+1,...,qi+1.
Also, v′ = q′
0,...,q′
j1,q′
j2+1,...,q′
i+1 is a legal run of A ′ on w′. Note that cost(A ,v) = cost(A ,r)−g
and cost(A ′,v′) = cost(A ′,r′)−g′. Since hi(q,q′) < hi+1(q,q′), both r and v end in qj1, both r′ and v′
end in q′
j1, and w′ is of length at most i (and may therefore serve as a witness to hi(q,q′)), it must be that
cost(A ,v)−cost(A ′,v′) < cost(A ,r)−cost(A ′,r′). Hence, g −g′ > 0.
For j ≥1, let wj =w1   wj1  (wj1+1   wj2)j. Thus, wj is obtained from w by pumping the sub-word
wj1+1   wj2 for j times. Let a = cost(A ,r,1, j1) and let a′ be the cost of the cheapest run of A ′ that
reads w1   wj1 and leads from q0 to q′
j1. Recall that g −g′ > 0, thus g > g′. Hence, since a, a′, t(qj1),
and t(q′
j1) are all ﬁnite, there must be j ≥ 0 for which a + j g +t(qj1) > a′ + j g′ +t(q′
j1). Since
cost(A ,wj) = a + j g +t(qj1) and cost(A ′,wj) ≤ a + j g +t(qj1), it follows that there is j ≥ 0 for
which cost(A ,wj) > cost(A ′,wj), thus A    A ′, and we are done.
AssumenowthatA   A ′. Letw=w1   wl betheshortestwordforwhichcost(A ,w)>cost(A ′,w).
Let r = q0,...,ql be the single run of A on w, and let r′ = q′
0,...,q′
l be a run of A ′ on w such that
cost(A ′,w) = cost(A ′,r′). Thus, r′ is the run along which cost(A ′,w) is achieved.
We distinguish between two cases. First, if l ≤ n2, then, by the deﬁnition of the functions hi, we have
hl(ql,q′
l) > t(q′
l)−t(ql), thus the algorithm detects that A    A ′ in Step 1.
Second, if l > n2, then there must be two indices 0 ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ n2 such that qj1 = qj2 and q′
j1 = q′
j2.
Let g = cost(A ,r, j1 +1, j2) and g′ = cost(A ′,r′, j1 +1, j2). Since w is the shortest word for which
cost(A ,w)>cost(A ′,w), itmustbethatg >g′. Indeed, otherwise, thewordw′ =w1   wj1 wj2+1   wl,
which is shorter than w, also satisﬁes cost(A ,w′) > cost(A ′,w′).
Let y ∈ S∗ be a word of length at most n2 that witnesses hn2(qj1,q′
j1). Thus, |y| = t, for t ≤ n2, and
there are runs s=s0,...,st and s′ =s′
0,...,s′
t of A and A ′, respectively, on y, such that st =qj1, s′
t =q′
j1,
and cost(A ,s,1,t)−cost(A ′,s′,1,t) = hn2(qj1,q′
j1).
Let j = j2− j1. Consider the word w′ = y wj1+1   wj2. The word w′ is of length t + j. The single
run of A on w′ is v=s0,s1,...,st,qj1+1,...,qj2. Also, v′ =s′
0,s′
1,...,s′
t,q′
j1+1,...,q′
j2 is a legal run of A ′
on w′. Note that cost(A ,v,1,t+ j) = cost(A ,s,1,t)+g and cost(A ′,v′,1,t+ j) = cost(A ′,s′,1,t)+g′.
Also, since w′ may serve as a witness to ht+j(qj1,q′
j2), it must be that ht+j(qj1,q′
j2) ≥ cost(A ,v,1,t +
j)−cost(A ′,v′,1,t + j). Since y witnesses ht(qj1,q′
j1) and g −g′ > 0, it follows that ht+j(qj1,q′
j1) >
ht(qj1,q′
j1). Since ht(qj1,q′
j1) = hn2(qj1,q′
j1), we conclude that ht+j(qj1,q′
j1) > hn2(qj1,q′
j1).
We claim that n2 <t+ j ≤2n2. Sincet, j ≤n2, then clearlyt+ j ≤2n2. To see that n2 <t+ j, assume
by way of contradiction that t + j ≤ n2. Then, the word w′ is of length at most n2, and it can serve as
witness to hn2(qj1,q′
j1). Since ht+j(qj1,q′
j1) > hn2(qj1,q′
j1), this contradicts the fact that y witnesses
hn2(qj1,q′
j1). Now, since ht+j(qj1,q′
j1) > hn2(qj1,q′
j1), we conclude that there is an iteration n2 ≤ i ≤ 2n2
such that hi(qj1,q′
j1) < hi+1(qj1,q′
j1), and the algorithm declares that A    A ′ is Step 2.
The function h0 can be calculated in polynomial time, and so is the function hi+1, given hi. Hence,
since we need only a polynomial number of iterations, we can conclude with the following.
Theorem 3.2. Consider a DWFA A and a penalty function q. The problem of deciding whether A is
q-resilient can be solved in polynomial time.
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4 Achieving Resilience with Minimum Resources
A system with no limit on penalties and with unbounded resources can prevent cheating by ﬁxing a
high penalty function. In practice, penalties may be limited by an external authority, and increasing the
probability of detecting cheats requires resources. In this section we study the problem of minimizing
the resources required in order to guarantee resilience.
We assume that the penalty function h is determined by an external authority and that A is (h,ˆ 1)-
resilient. Thus, the environment has no incentive to cheat if cheating is always detected.3 Given a WFA
A , and a penalty function h, our goal is to ﬁnd a detection-probability function p, such that A is (h,p)-
resilient to cheating and the budget B = ås,s′∈Sh(s,s′)  p(s,s′) is minimal. The rationale behind our
goal is that the system can control the probability of catching cheats. In practice, detection probability
can be increased by investing in “guards”, each responsible for a speciﬁc possible cheat. The budget we
have is the total payment for the guards. The payment to the guard responsible for detecting s being
reported as s′ is independent of the actual number of times s is being reported as s′. On the other
hand, the payment is proportional to the penalty h(s,s′) charged whenever the guard detects the cheat.
Indeed, in practice, detecting a cheat with a high penalty tends to require high resources: knowing that his
success leads to a high revenue, a guard would require high salary. We say that A can achieve resilience
with budget B if there are h and p such that the budget of h and p is B, and A is (h,p)-resilient to
cheating.
As explained in Section 2.2, we can consider an equivalent non-probabilistic setting in which all
cheats are always detected and are charged according to the penalty function q =h ◦p. In the rest of this
section we therefore consider the problem of deciding, given a WFA A and a budget B ∈ IR≥0, whether
A can achieve resilience with budget B, as well as the optimization problem of ﬁnding the minimal
budget with which A can achieve resilience. A solution for the above problems induces the expected-
fee function q. Having q in hand, we use the given penalty function h to ﬁx p(s,s′) =
q(s,s′)
h(s,s′). In
order to guaranteed that our solution is feasible, that is, the probability function is over the rage [0,1],
our algorithm only considers solutions in which for all s,s′ ∈ S we have h(s,s′) ≥ q(s,s′).
4.1 Hardness Proof for WFA
We ﬁrst show that, as in the resilience testing problem, the nondeterministic setting is much more difﬁ-
cult.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a WFA A . Given a budget B, the problem of deciding whether there is a penalty
function q with budget B such that A is q-resilient to cheating is PSPACE-hard.
Proof: As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we do a reduction from the universality problem for NFAs.
Given an NFA U , we construct a WFA AU such that there is a penalty function q with budget 0 with
which AU is q-resilient to cheating iff U is universal.
The construction is similar to the one described in the proof of Theorem 3.1, except that now the
transition from q0 to qacc is labeled by both all the letters in S\{a}, with cost 0, and the letter a, with
cost 1. It is easy to see that the cost in AU of words of the form a w is 0 for w ∈ L(A ) and is 1 for
3Note that this is a reasonable assumption as otherwise, the authority providing the penalty function encourages cheating.
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w  ∈ L(A ). Also, for s  = a, the cost of words of the form s  w is 0, regardless of the membership of w
in L(A ). Accordingly, if U is universal, then AU accepts all words in S∗ with cost 0, and is therefore
0-resilient, in which a budget 0 sufﬁces to ensure resilience. Also, if U is not universal, then there is
w ∈L(U ) such that cost(AU ,a w)=1, while faked cost(AU ,a w,b w)=q(a,b), for any b∈S\{a}.
Hence, in order to ensure q-resilience, a penalty function q must satisfy q(a,b) ≥ 1, thus the budget
required to q is at least |S|−1, and we are done.
4.2 A Polynomial Algorithm for DWFA
We turn to consider deterministic WFAs. Note that if we deﬁne an order ≤ between penalty functions,
where q1 ≤q2 iff q1(s,s′)≤q2(s,s′) for all s,s′ ∈S, then the penalty functions that ensure resilience
are not linearly ordered. This last observation hints that the problem of ﬁnding a minimal sufﬁcient
penalty with respect to which A is resilient cannot be solved in a straightforward way, as it cannot be
based on a search in a linearly ordered domain. Still, as we show below, when A is a deterministic
DFA, it is possible to describe the resilience requirements as a set of linear inequality constraints. Since
the optimization objective can be also described as a linear function, it is possible to determine the
minimal sufﬁcient penalty function using linear programming (LP). LP is a mathematical tool suitable
for determining an optimal solution for a linear objective function deﬁned over a set of variables, while
obeying a set of requirements represented as linear equations [Chv83].
We describe the problem as a linear programming optimization problem with a polynomial number
of variables and constraints. Given a WFA A and a penalty function h, the algorithm returns a new
penalty function q such that:
1. ås,s′∈Sq(s,s′) is minimal.
2. For all s,s′ ∈ S, we have 0 ≤
q(s,s′)
h(s,s′) ≤ 1.
3. A is q-resilient.
Note that the second property assures that q = h ◦ p, for some probability function p satisfying
p(s,s′) ∈ [0,1].
The ﬁrst property deﬁnes the objective function of the LP. The LP constraints assure the second and
third properties. Speciﬁcally, for the third property, the LP constraints assure that the algorithm described
in Section 3.2, for testing whether A is q-resilient, would return A   Cheat(A ,q). Accordingly, the
variables we use are the following:
• For all s,s′ ∈ S, the variable qs,s′ maintains the penalty function q(s,s′).
• For 0 ≤ i ≤ 2n2 and q,q′ ∈ Q, the variable hi,q,q′ maintains hi(q,q′).
• For 0 ≤ i ≤ 2n2, q,q′ ∈ Q, and s ∈ S, the variable gi,q,q′,s maintains gi(q,q′,s).
The objective function is minås,s′ qs,s′. Since the penalty function is non-negative, we have |S|2
constraints qs,s′ ≥ 0 for all s,s′ ∈ S. In addition, qs,s = 0 for all s ∈ S. Also, in order to guarantee
that the detection-probability function is feasible, we have, for all s,s′ ∈ S, the constraint qs,s′ ≤ hs,s′.
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The additional constraints follow the structure of the algorithm presented in Section 3.2. For k =
1,...,n2, the k-th set of constraints assures that no word of length at most k should beneﬁt from cheating.
For k = n2 +1,...,2n2, the k-th set of constraints assures that no cycle that can lead to unlimited gain
exists. Each such set consists of a polynomial number of constraints and introduces a polynomial number
of variables. Speciﬁcally, variables of type hi,q,q′ bound the gain of words of length at most i, and
variables of type gi,q,q′,s bound this gain for words of length at most i ending with s. While the variables
hi,q,q′,gi,q,q′,s are deﬁned for every 0 ≤ i ≤ 2n2, q,q′ ∈ Q, and s ∈ S, in practice, many of these variables
are not constrained, as it might be that no word of length at most i can reach state q in A and q′ in A ′.
We ﬁrst describe the constraints considering words of length 1, and then the constraints for general
k. Note that the ﬁrst set of constraints can be viewed as a special case of the general set, however, since
we know that q0 is the only possible state preceding states reachable by a single letter, the presentation of
this set is simpler. We also note that in order to clarify the intuition behind each constraint, the constraints
are not necessarily presented in the canonical form of an LP (that is, with all variables in the left hand
side and all constants in the right hand side).
In order to assure that words of length 1 will not cheat, we have a variable h1,q,q′ for all q,q′ ∈ Q,
and a variable g1,q,q′,s for all q,q′ ∈ Q,s ∈ S. To reﬂect Equation (1) in the algorithm described in
Section 3.2, we have, for all s′ ∈ S such that D(q0,s,q) and D(q0,s′,q′), the constraint g1,q,q′,s ≥
c(q0,s,q)−c(q0,s′,q′)−q(s,s′). To reﬂect Equation (2), we have, for all q,q′ ∈ Q and s ∈ S for
which g1,q,q′,s is bounded, the constraint h1,q,q′ ≥ g1,q,q′,s. Since h0(q0,q0) = 0 and the sequence of
functions h0,h1,...is non-decreasing, we also have, for the state q0, the constraint h1(q0,q0)≥0. Finally,
to reﬂect the comparison done in Step 1 of the resilience-testing algorithm, for all q,q′ ∈ Q we have the
constraint h1,q,q′ ≤ t(q′)−t(q).
For example, the ﬁrst set of constraints deﬁned for the DWFA A in Figure 4 is as follows.
g1,q1,q2,a ≥ 2−3−qa,b h1(q1,q2) ≥ g1,q1,q2,a
g1,q1,q2,a ≥ 2−8−qa,c h1(q1,q2) ≤ 5−10
g1,q2,q1,b ≥ 3−2−qb,a h1(q2,q1) ≥ g1,q2,q1,b
g1,q2,q1,c ≥ 8−2−qc,a h1(q2,q1) ≥ g1,q2,q1,c
g1,q2,q2,b ≥ 3−8−qb,c h1(q2,q1) ≤ 10−5
g1,q2,q2,c ≥ 8−3−qc,b h1(q2,q2) ≥ g1,q2,q2,c
h1(q0,q0) ≥ 0 h1(q2,q2) ≥ g1,q2,q2,b
h1(q2,q2) ≤ 5−5
In order to assure that words of length i do not cheat, we have a variable hi,q,q′ for all q,q′ ∈ Q, and a
variable gi,q,q′,s for all q,q′ ∈ Q and s ∈ S. To reﬂect Equation (1), we have, for all p,p′ ∈ Q and s′ ∈ S
such that D(p,s,q) and D(p′,s′,q′), the constraint
gi,q,q′,s ≥ hi−1,p,p′ +c(p,s,q)−c(p′,s′,q′)−q(s,s′).
To reﬂect Equation (2), we have, for all q,q′ ∈ Q and s ∈ S for which gi,q,q′,s is bounded, the constraint
hi,q,q′ ≥ gi,q,q′,s. Also, for all q,q′ ∈ Q we have the constraints hi,q,q′ ≥ hi−1,q,q′. Finally, for all q,q′ ∈ Q
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Figure 4: The DWFA A .
we have the constraint hi,q,q′ ≤ t(q′)−t(q). This last type of constraints, considering the ﬁnal costs,
corresponds to the comparison done in Step 1 of the resilience-testing algorithm.
For example, for the DWFA presented in Figure 4, the following are the constraints relevant to words
of length 2 that without cheating must get to q2 but consider getting to q1. Since words of length 1 can
only reach q1 or q2 and D(q1,c,q2) = D(q2,c,q2) = / 0, there are no constraints involving the variable
g2,q2,q1,c.
g2,q2,q1,a ≥ h1,q2,q2 +6−2−q(a,c) g2,q2,q1,b ≥ h1,q2,q1 +7−4−q(b,a)
g2,q2,q1,a ≥ h1,q2,q1 +6−4−q(a,a) g2,q2,q1,b ≥ h1,q2,q1 +7−2−q(b,b)
g2,q2,q1,a ≥ h1,q2,q1 +6−2−q(a,b) g2,q2,q1,b ≥ h1,q2,q1 +7−1−q(b,c)
g2,q2,q1,a ≥ h1,q2,q1 +6−1−q(a,c) g2,q2,q2,b ≥ h1,q2,q1 +7−2−q(b,c)
h2,q2,q1 ≥ g2,q2,q1,a h2,q2,q1 ≥ h1,q2,q1
h2,q2,q1 ≥ g2,q2,q1,b h2,q2,q1 ≤ 10−5
For k = n2 +1...2k2, the set of variables and the set of constraints are very similar to these sets
for k ≤ n2. The only difference is the last type of constraints for every q,q′ ∈ Q. Instead of hi,q,q′ ≤
t(q′)−t(q), we have hi,q,q′ ≤ hi−1,q,q′. These constraints corresponds to the detection of gain increasing
cycles, done in step 2 of the resilience testing algorithm.
The correctness of the following claim follows from the construction of the constraints.
Claim 4.2. The set of penalty functions in all feasible solutions to the LP is identical to the set of penalty
functions for which the resilience algorithm provides a positive answer.
In particular, the feasible solution for which ås,s′ qs,s′ is minimized, corresponds to a penalty func-
tion with minimal total budget. The total number of constraints and variables in our LP is polynomial
in |Q| and |S|. Therefore, it is possible to ﬁnd an optimal solution for it [Kha79, Chv83] in polynomial
time. This implies a polynomial algorithm for the minimum cost resilience problem of a DWFA.
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